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and Cruces (2009), who focus mostly on inequality.  We use modern descriptive tools 
to provide a complete map of the changes in many aspects of the distribution of 
income, and stress the fact that other key measures changes dramatically along 
inequality. In particular, we focus on documenting the changes in inequality along 
those of poverty and the size of the middle class. 
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1.  Introduction 
In most regions and episodes the shape of the income distribution changes slowly, a 
fact that led Henry Aaron (1978) to state that following them is like “watching the grass 
grow”. Unlike monetary or financial indicators,  poverty or inequality indexes are 
computed mostly on a yearly basis; moreover, comparative studies have troubles 
establishing statistical and economic significance of changes in contiguous years (see 
Sosa Escudero and Gasparini (2001)).  
In the last thirty years Latin American countries underwent a period of drastic 
changes, including episodes of marked cyclical macroeconomic performance, as well as 
profound changes in their economic structures, associated to the 
globalization/privatization policies of the early nineties. In the case of Argentina, and 
in contrast to Aaron’s appreciations, the distribution of incomes changed rapidly and 
significantly during this period, to the point that the title of a song by the cult pop band 
The Move (“I can hear the grass grow”) seems to provide a more accurate description. 
Mean income, or related measures of central tendency, like per-capita GDP, 
sometimes adequately serve the purpose of tracing out the movements in the income 
distribution, and perform well during episodes where its shape changes slowly. This 
fact may help justify the scarcity of distributional studies before the nineties in 
Argentina.  The macro-dominated eighties appropriately focused on following GDP, 
since most changes in the distribution of incomes during that period were macro 
driven location movements, with subtle changes in other relevant aspects, as 
documented in Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2001).  
The nineties witnessed a massive growth in the number of distributive studies 
for Argentina, mostly fueled by the fact that inequality and poverty rose persistently 
since then. The increasing availability of micro data, the sharp decrease in 
computational costs, and the development of new econometric tools, are all factors that 
help explain this trend. Nevertheless, the key reason inequality and poverty received 
so much attention in the last years lies in the dramatic changes experienced by the 
country, and in the urgency of adopting sound policy measures aimed at alleviating 
the effects of poverty and inequality. 
A relevant recent study by Leonardo Gasparini and Guillermo Cruces (2009) 
documents with detail the literature on inequality in Argentina, identifying historical 
episodes and highlighting possible explanatory factors, and serves as an important 
starting point for this paper; as a matter of fact, the quote by Aaron is taken from the 
Introduction to theirs. 
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In light of the drastic changes in the distribution of income in Argentina in the last 
thirty years, it is natural to wonder whether these can be appropriately captured by 
looking at just mean/median incomes and inequality measures.  Poverty rates, the size 
of the middle class, polarization indexes, are examples of concepts that focus on other 
aspects of the distribution of income, that might have worsened alongside inequality, 
and must be addressed as well.  
The main goal of this paper is to complement inequality and mean income 
analysis by looking at the whole income distribution, with the purpose of providing a 
more detailed analysis of distributive changes in Argentina that might be overlooked 
by inequality and income trends. For example, as will be discussed in this article, the 
Gini coefficients for 1996 and 2006 are very similar, even though they correspond to 
income distributions of a markedly different shape. 
Our approach is mostly descriptive. The main goal is to establish some stylized 
facts on the changes of the whole distribution of income, beyond its center and 
dispersion. We make no attempts at explaining the causes behind these changes, but 
try to establish similarities and differences in the evolution of alternative aspects of the 
income distribution, that should serve as a sound basis for further research aimed at 
providing causal explorations of these phenomena and, hopefully, at proposing 
relevant policy measures.  
The paper is organized as follows. We start with data description and some 
basic facts, focusing mostly on mean incomes and inequality. In section 3 we step back 
and adopt a more agnostic non-parametric approach by looking at the whole 
distribution of incomes, without any attempt of reducing it to summary measures. 
Section 4 focuses on specific regions of the distribution of income, like the bottom 
(poverty) or the center (middle class). Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The basic facts: income and inequality in Argentina 
Figure 1 sets the starting point for this research. It shows (in different scales) the 
evolution of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, and median income, in the 
period 1974 to 2006.  This figure is eloquent about the impressions advanced in the 
Introduction: median income wandered cyclically (including periods of severe 
depressions, more intense than those of recovery), but inequality rose steadily and 
significantly until 2002, after which, clear signs of recovery are observed. 
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The notion of income used in the paper is per-capita income as reported to the 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), which covers mostly labor income and 
monetary transfers.  We have deflacted nominal measures using the official consumer 
price index. Micro data for the analysis will be the EPH for Greater Buenos Aires 
(GBA). The focus on a single region may sound severely restrictive at first glance, but, 
as Gasparini and Cruces (2009) clearly document, including all regions leaves the 
evolutions of aggregate distributive figures virtually unaltered. On the contrary, the 
costs of including other regions are prohibitive for the study of evolutions: only GBA is 
available for a rather long period, a key element in establishing the main point of this 
article, which requires going back in time as far as possible, using a comparable data 
set. 
Household surveys have several limitations to capture the true income 
distribution, and a myriad of technical decisions are usually taken to deal with some of 
them, including underreport, the need to find a relevant numeraire to handle 
household compositions (per capita, by equivalent adults, etc.), the inability to capture 
alternative sources (like, implicit rents from owned assets), among many others. These 
problems are important when the goal is to measure the levels of inequality and 
welfare, but are of a smaller magnitude when the focus is on their evolutions. For the 
purposes of this paper, we favor a readily reproducible and comparable approach, for 
which we will stay as close as possible to official, publicly available micro-data. 
Gasparini, Sosa Escudero and Marchionni (2001) and Gasparini and Cruces (2009) 
present a very detailed discussion of alternative welfare measures based on different 
notions of incomes. Gasparini and Gluzman (2009) compare official statistics with 
privately administered data. Their results support the idea that even though levels may 
present marked differences; evolutions behave similarly under alternative notions of 
income and sources. 
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Back to the results in Figure 1, inequality grew steadily since 1974. The Gini 
measure rose almost monotonically from 0.349 in 1974 to a peak of 0.55 in 2003, after 
which a period of steady decline started, that puts this figure in 0.48 for 2006. 
Alternative measures of inequality  (Theil, Atkinson, or an entropy-based measure) 
reveal a similar pattern 
An alternative way to gauge the severity of the problem is to view the evolution 
of inequality in Argentina from a cross-sectional, comparative perspective. A Gini 
coefficient of 0.35 (Argentina in 1974) corresponds to the same figure for the United 
Kingdom in 2005, and the peak value of 0.55 in 2003 compares to inequality in Brazil or 
Ecuador, also in 2005. That is, in the period 1974-2003, and in terms of the performance 
of 2005, Argentina moved from an inequality measure of a developed country like the 
UK, to that of Brazil and Ecuador, countries with a long history of severe distributive 
problems.  
An important issue behind the strong increasing trend in inequality before 2002 
is the effect of early information, especially data from the first available points (1974, 
1980 and 1986), who have a major effect in determining the, overall, explosive positive 
trend. As a matter of fact, out of the increase in 0.2 in the Gini coefficient between 1974 
and 2003, almost half of this took place along these three periods. This appreciation 
does not cast doubts on the severity of increasing inequality in Argentina (specially in 
the nineties), but highlights the limitations of making long run assessments when 
overall trends are difficult to establish. More concretely, had the analysis been 
conducted with the likely more reliable and comparable information starting in the late 
eighties, the perception of the recovery after 2003 suggests a more drastic change in 
trends than would appear when including distant years like 1974. This fact stresses the 
need to dig more deeply into the evolution of inequality, in a more historical, long run 
perspective. Alvaredo (2008) is a clear example of the many difficulties in exploring 
distributive issue from a historical perspective. The Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Economic History (2010)  presents a recent collection of papers on the issue. 
A second look at Figure 1 shows an interesting pattern. It reveals the marked 
countercyclical behavior of inequality: aggregate improvements in income (as 
measured by median income) are usually accompanied by improvement (decreases) in 
inequality. The scope of this paper and the short temporal span of observations prevent 
us from performing a meticulous time series analysis of this pattern, which would 
require dealing with the likely non-stationary nature of the series involved. 
Nevertheless, these preliminary results are strongly suggestive: in spite of the marked 
increasing trend in inequality, short term movements are strongly associated to the 
overall performance of the economy.  As a matter of fact, the correlation coefficient for 
the median income and the Gini measure is 0.92. This is particularly relevant for (and 
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very likely driven by) the period after 2002, where the reversion in income trends was 
accompanied by a sharp decline in inequality. This is a much relevant issue that truly 
deserves a more detailed econometric, and hopefully causal analysis.  
To summarize the results of this section, there is clear evidence of a marked 
increase in inequality in the nineties, robust to alternative ways of measuring it, and of 
a rapid decline after 2003. The perception of the sudden increase is magnified by its 
comparison with inequality at the beginning of the analysis, in 1974, where the low 
numbers observed are comparable to those of a developed country like the UK. The 
relevance of 1974 as a sound benchmark is debatable and, certainly, requires more 
analysis. We also highlight the seldom explored cyclical nature of inequality, that 
beyond its trending behavior shows a strong correlation with the cyclical evolution of 
median income. This is an important subject that requires more technical scrutiny. 
 
3.  A non-parametric perspective of distributive changes in Argentina 
In 2006, after the rapid recovery after abandoning convertibility, the Argentine 
economy presented very similar levels of inequality (a Gini index of around 0.47) as in 
1994, that is, before the start of the crisis that climaxed in 2002. The anti-cyclical 
behavior suggested in the previous section, and the observed trend hint towards a 
stage of recovery in terms of inequality.  In light of the drastic changes observed in 
inequality and median income in this period, it is cautious to wonder whether other 
aspects of the distribution changed as radically as its dispersion and center, and how 
this sudden recovery in terms of inequality affected the whole distribution. 
Non-parametric techniques are powerful tools when the purpose is to reveal the 
shapes of relevant densities, like that of incomes. Burkhauser et al. (1999) is one of the 
first studies along these lines. Botargues and Petrecolla (1999) is a very early example 
for Argentina. We refer to Li and Racine (2007) for a detailed discussion of these 
methods. 
Figure 2 shows a three dimensional plot of the evolution of the income densities 
for the period 1974-2006. The income density for each year is estimated separately 
using standard non-parametric kernel methods.  Bandwidths are chosen using a data-
driven algorithm, and results are robust to significant variations in these values.  
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There are several aspects highlighted by these estimates. First, inequality 
increased mostly due to movements of the central part of the densities, to its left, with 
much larger intensity in the low ranges.  As will be discussed in more detail in the next 
subsection, inequality and poverty moved synchronically in the period under study. 
This appreciation makes increases in inequality look even more dramatic.  The 
deterioration in inequality is captured by a marked accumulation of values around 
lower levels of income, that is, a relatively flat density for 1974 contrasts strongly with 
the highly peaked ones of the late nineties.  
A relevant comment is that periods of rapid acceleration in prices (for example, 
the hyperinflationary episode of 1989, or the devaluation in 2002) imply drastic 
changes in the distribution of incomes with a sudden accumulation in low values, 
followed by a very rapid recovery.  This pattern is highlighted in Figure 3, which 
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presents densities estimated for the period covering the 2002 crisis. These sudden 
changes (which have a stronger impact on poverty measures) are likely driven by 
similar movements in the deflactors used to compute real income.  Consequently, years 
corresponding to large variations in price levels introduce significant volatility and 
may confound the analysis of trends.  For example, in our plot in Figure 2, the high 
peaked density in 2002 looks more like an outlying observation that actually masks 
(and drives) the rapid recovery in the following year. 
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Regarding our original concern about the need to observe income distributions 
beyond median income and inequality, Figure 4 compares income densities for 1986 
and 2006, which cover a period of drastic changes. The year 1986 provides a more 
representative starting point, free from the concerns regarding the isolated measures of 
the 70’s (as discussed in the previous section), right after the recovery of democracy 
and after the implementation of strong policy measures aimed at controlling inflation 
(the Plan Austral).  The solid vertical line represent the poverty line (almost identical in 
both periods, in real terms), and median incomes are marked in the horizontal axis.  
Thin lines correspond to 1986, and thick ones to 2006. Inequality is larger in 2006, but 
differences are not as dramatic as those implied by the years right after the crisis in 
2002.  Nevertheless, the shape of the density of incomes is completely different.  In 1986 
the poverty line lies to the left of the mode whereas in 2006 to its right. The facts that 
the density shifted to the left, and that the poverty line remained constant imply that 
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poverty in 2006 is not only higher but also much more “stable” than in 1986.  Unlike 
1986, in 2006 the mode of the whole income density is also the mode of the income of 
the poor, whereas in 1986 the modal income of the poor is, trivially, the poverty line 
itself.  
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The results of the previous section suggest a period of rapid and significant 
recovery after 2003. It is interesting to observe whether this recovery implies a return to 
the situation in the early nineties, right before the rapid deterioration of inequality 
started.  Figure 5 compares 1994 and 2006. These two periods are interesting. The year 
1994 marks the start of the process of sustained increases in inequality and poverty, but 
with very similar values of inequality and median income to those of 2006, the last 
period under analysis, and well after the decreases in inequality experienced after the 
crisis of 2002.  Even though the centers (median and mean income) and dispersions 
(inequality) of these densities are almost the same, the underlying densities are 
different. In the comparison between these two periods, the right tail of the density 
remained unaltered  for both distributions whereas a substantial proportion of the 
center of 1994 distribution shifted to the left.  
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Inequality remained unaltered in these two periods, mainly because most to the 
changes took place close to the left of the center of the densities. That is, more 
accumulation in the right tail would drive inequality up, but more concentration close 
to the median would drive inequality down. In 2006 the poverty line lies clearly to the 
right of the mode, unlike 1994, where it lies very close to it. Consequently, even though 
in terms of inequality and median income the argentine economy has given clear 
signals of recovery, the poor appears as a more homogeneous and stable than in 1994. 
Finally, even though the estimated densities clearly point towards a much more 
peaked distribution, with a stronger prevalence of the poor as modal group, the results 
do not suggest obvious unambiguous clusterings based on income. Visual inspection 
does not reveal relevant multimodalities that would enable the classification of 
individuals in markedly different groups, like the extreme poor, the rich, or even the 
middle class. A more detailed analysis of the possible presence of multimodalities is 
beyond the scope of this article, but it is an interesting research topic, which requires a 
more careful treatment in order to deal with the markedly asymmetric nature of the 
distribution of incomes, and more formal tests of these multimodalities. 
To summarize, inequality increased considerably but also implied a drastic 
change in the center and left tail of the distribution of income, leaving the poor as a 
larger and more cohesive group, that now clearly contains the mode of the distribution. 
As a matter of fact, even after the drastic decreases in inequality in the last five years, 
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the Argentine distribution of incomes is not returning to the shape it had before the 
sudden changes implied by the crisis in 2002.  
 
4. The poor and the middle class 
The previous section suggests that important movements took place at the left of the 
distribution.  Also, the lack of obvious multimodalities make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to rely on the income distribution itself to identify groups like the poor, the 
rich, or the middle class.  That is, if these groups truly exist, they must be identified 
exogenously, and we must accept the fact that any disjoint, sharp partition among 
them should be very sensitive to the choice of the thresholds that define them. 
 
4.1 The poor 
Consider the case of the poor. If a standard poverty line criterion is adopted to 
identify them, when income becomes very concentrated close to the poverty line, 
classifications become erratic, as a substantial number of individuals with incomes 
marginally above the line are rendered as non-poor, even though in economic terms 
their income is indistinguishable from that of  those marginally below.  Naturally, a 
similar comment holds for the middle class. 
In periods of sudden changes in nominal and real variables, like in Argentina, 
this issue affects poverty considerably. Figure 6 shows the evolutions of inequality and 
poverty, the latter measured by the headcount ratio using official poverty lines.  
Isolated numbers are dramatic, since the range of variation covers low values in the 
eighties (below 35%) and figures above 60% during the crisis in 2002. The long swings 
associated with strong accommodations of relative prices (mentioned in the previous 
section), are much more marked in the case of poverty than inequality, which is natural 
since in computing poverty, deflactors play an important role in determining income 
as well as the poverty line. As a matter of fact, the correlation between poverty rates 
and median income is negative and high (-0.84), but lower than that of inequality and 
median income.  
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An important point stressed in the previous section, is that the income of the 
poor in 2006 is more concentrated at lower values, hence, increases in the poverty line 
take place in 2006 along a descending part of the density, far away from the mode, 
unlike 1994, when the line is very close to the modal value. Figure 7 explores this 
argument with more detail, for the whole period. The solid thick line represents the 
modal income, and the thin one the mean income of the poor (with a different scale); 
we have also added the poverty line with a dashed line.  From 1974 to 1986 the mode 
of the whole distribution lies to the right of the poverty line, hence the latter is 
(trivially) the mode of the poor.  Overall, the pattern is similar to other measures: the 
mode departs further away (to the left) with respect to the poverty line, with a 
recovery after 2002. Modes represent points of high concentration of individuals, and 
these results clearly show that the mode of the poor has moved further to the left of the 
poverty line in the nineties, but, unlike inequality, the recovery after the crisis is not 
enough to restore it to its initial position, below the poverty line. This is the sense in 
which we claim that even after the clear signs of recovery in inequality terms, the poor 
are left behind as a more coherent group. 
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4.2 The middle class 
The problems of  identifying the poor are more severe when performing the same task 
for the middle class. As a matter of fact, it is relevant to remark that middle class 
studies are almost inexistent compared to those available for poverty and inequality. 
Some very recent references for Argentina are Callorda and Caruso (2009), Olivieri 
(2009) and Cruces et al. (2009), the latter including a more detailed discussion of 
alternative measures of the middle class. 
As expected, there is not a well established operational definition of the middle 
class.  Without being too specific about details (we refer to Cruces et al. (2009) for a 
lengthy discussion), alternative measures favor either relative notions (“those between 
the 0.3 and 0.8 percentiles” as in Barro and Easterley (2001)) or absolute (“those with 
income between 2 and 10 dollars per day”, as in Banerjee and Duflo (2007)). Birdsall et 
al. (2002) define the middle class as those with incomes between 0.75 and 1.25 times the 
median income.  Naturally, the Barro-Easterley measure implies a constant size of the 
middle class (it is always 50%), so to measure its importance, they focus on the mean 
income of this group.  A second problem with this measure is that it ignores the 
implicit definitions of the poor in terms of poverty lines, that is, and for the case of 
Argentina, in the last part of the crisis many families would be doubly classified as 
poor and middle class if a standard poverty line is used to identify the poor, and the 
Barro-Easterly concept is used to define the middle class. A similar concern affects 
Birdsall et al.’s measure. Banerjee and Duflo’s approach is compatible with one 
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particular definition of the poor (based on the U$S 2 per day line).  Another relevant 
problem with identifying the sizes of the middle class is related to the well known 
difficulties household surveys have in capturing rich families. This may distort 
severely the importance of the middle class as compared to that of those above it, since 
families in that range are either absent from surveys or appear with grossly 
underreported incomes.   
We will consider a fourth simple strategy, which consists in defining the middle 
class as those above the poverty line and below the 0.9 percentile of income. Though 
trivial (the size of the middle class is determined by that of the poor, as its mirror 
image since the “rich” is always 10 percent), this measure is a compromise between an 
absolute one like in Banerjee and Duflo (but using as lower bound the poverty line), 
and a relative magnitude on the right tail (like in Barro and Easterley), where there is 
less agreement about how to separate the rich from the rest, and in a region where 
missing data and underreport are very likely to occur. Two measures will be computed 
from our definition: the first one is simply the proportion of individuals in the middle 
class, which, as mentioned above, is by definition a mirror image of the poor. The 
second is the ratio of the size of the middle class over that of poor, which measures the 
relative importance of the middle class as compared to a well defined group in 
absolute terms, like the poor. 
Figure 8 presents estimates of the size of the middle class, based on the previous 
concepts. The thick line represents our proposed “hybrid” criterion, and the thin line 
represents Banerjee and Duflo’s measure (BD, henceforth). Trivially, the horizontal 0.5 
line represent Barro and Easterly’s measure. As expected, differences are relevant, 
since both measures are based on alternative thresholds. During the nineties, both 
measures stay surprisingly close to the Barro/Easterley figure. When the crisis starts, 
our measure drops dramatically, a consequence of the sudden increase in poverty 
rates. The BD measure stays relatively close, mostly due to the fact that it contains as 
middle class many individuals rendered as poor by the standard poverty line criterion.   
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Figure 9 offers an alternative perspective. Based on our proposed hybrid 
measure, we computed the ratio of the sizes of the middle class and the poor.  This 
measure has a clear negative trend, more compatible with the perceive notion of 
deterioration of the middle class. Beyond the trending behavior described above, there 
is one episode where the size of the poor exceeds that of the middle class, 
corresponding, precisely, to the drastic crisis of 2002.  In spite of the comments of the 
previous section in terms of the volatility of poverty measures in such periods, it is 
important to highlight this issue: critical episodes put the poor as the largest group in 
the society, and in the center of the action of distributive dynamics.  
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Regarding the income of the middle class, Figure 10 presents the measures 
proposed by BE, BD, and ours. The overall trends look similar as those for the sizes, 
but an important difference arises. When the focus is on the mean income of the 
middle class, the nineties are a rather stable (though erratic) period. This may be due to 
a composition effect. The BD measure treats as middle class many individuals 
considered as poor by standard poverty analysis (and hence, out of the middle class in 
our hybrid definition), hence for the middle class as defined by BE, the increases in 
median income of the nineties are mixed with the increases in poverty (and inequality) 
in the same period, resulting in minor variations in the average income of the middle 
class as defined by BE, which includes widely heterogeneous individuals. 
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The results of this section suggest that the middle class is a very elusive concept 
if its identification is based solely in income. When defined endogenously, in relative 
terms,  and jointly with the poor, the middle class is subject to the wide movements of 
the poor, and as a consequence, it decreased considerably in the nineties, but recovered 
quickly after 2003. On the other hand, when defined exogenously and in absolute 
terms, like in Barro and Easterly, it is a much more stable unit, except for periods 
where median income decreases sharply, as in the crisis.   
 Many social actors perceive that the nineties had a strong negative effect on the 
middle class. According to our results this perception is compatible with a relative 
notion of middle class (like our hybrid measure), mostly reflecting the increasing 
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importance of the poor.  In connection with the results of the previous sections, the fact 
that in the nineties modes occur outside most characterizations of the middle class in 
Argentina, imply that the center of the distribution of those in the middle class is not 
representative of them, that is, and unlike the poor, the distribution of incomes within 
the middle class became flatter. Either the existence of the middle class became 
unrepresentative, as compared to that of the poor, or its identification should rely on 
alternative welfare components, that cannot be appropriately represented by income. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In the last thirty years Argentina experienced drastic changes in its income 
distribution, mostly characterized by a long period of increased inequality and 
poverty, and a stage of recovery after 2003. Inequality and poverty figures reached 
dramatic levels, which justifies placing these distributive issues right at the center of 
the academic and policy agenda of the country.  
The results of this paper show that it is important to trace out the whole income 
distribution along that of inequality, especially in its lower parts. Increases in 
inequality are mostly driven by deterioration in the lower levels of the distribution of 
income. Besides increasing inequality, the nineties left the poor as a larger and more 
homogeneous entity. If modal income is taken as representative of a distribution, in the 
eighties it represented the division between the poor and the non-poor, while after the 
crisis (and even after the recovery took place), it now represents the poor.  
The middle class is an elusive group, that if defined residually from the poor, it 
evolves as its mirror image. The fact that after the nineties, the mode of the income 
distribution lies within the range of the poor implies that the distribution of income 
inside the middle class is more homogeneous, and hence its median income less 
representative of its individuals, that is, the average income of the middle class 
represents a center of a rather flat distribution, making it a less coherent group. A 
dramatic result is its relative performance in critical periods. The results show that in 
the last thirty years, and coinciding with the crises, the middle class lost its 
predominance over the poor.  
Other relevant results of this paper are the strong correlation of median 
incomes and inequality, or poverty: crises affect inequality and poverty negatively, but 
recoveries quickly restore levels to less dramatic ones. We also highlight the fact that 
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critical episodes introduce substantial instabilities in distributive figures, so those years 
should be handled with care.  
Many aspects of this study deserve further analysis. The cyclical behavior of 
inequality and income (a long standing issue in the development literature that dates 
back to the “Kuznets Hypothesis”) deserves more careful study. Time series analysis 
seems prohibitive due to the limited availability of long series of distributive measures, 
but dynamic panel strategies may compensate the short temporal dimension with 
cross-sectional variability. A more focused exploration on the performance of the rich 
is still a difficult but much relevant subject. Also, this study focuses strictly on 
monetary income. Recent trends in the literature (see the collection of papers In 
Kakwani and Silber (2008)) emphasize the multidimensional nature of welfare, 
suggesting that other dimensions should be studied alongside income in order to 
assess its evolution. In particular, the results of this paper suggest that income per-se 
has serious troubles in producing well separated groups like the poor or the middle 
class, which speaks about the relevance of adding other dimensions of welfare that 
may help finding and defining such partitions. Finally, and obviously, causal studies of 
the determinants of these changes are as urgent as the need to design and agree on the 
implementation of sound policy measures, aimed at alleviating the negative effects of 
the drastic distributive changes experienced by Argentina in its recent history. The 
results of this paper, hopefully, should help establishing some empirical regularities 
that deserve deeper investigation. 
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Table: Basic Measures for Argentina 
 
Year Gini 
Atkinson 
(2) 
Theil 
(0.5) 
Entropy 
(0.5) 
Mean 
Income 
Median 
Income 
90/10 
Quantil 
50/10 
Quantil 
90 
Quantil 
10 
Quantil 
Poverty 
(Survey) 
Middle Class  
(Hybrid) 
Middle Class 
(BD) 
1974 0.350 0.414 0.215 0.209 475 392 4.865 2.243 849 175 0.071 0.826 0.250 
1980 0.409 0.656 0.298 0.282 450 340 7.329 2.800 890 121 0.152 0.748 0.332 
1986 0.433 0.493 0.332 0.322 405 305 7.619 2.857 812 107 0.215 0.684 0.403 
1988 0.467 0.575 0.399 0.375 297 206 9.800 3.311 609 62 0.446 0.454 0.541 
1991 0.474 0.530 0.396 0.400 297 197 8.316 2.789 589 71 0.371 0.528 0.581 
1992 0.453 0.528 0.363 0.351 337 236 7.857 2.673 695 88 0.284 0.615 0.516 
1993 0.451 0.548 0.368 0.350 359 252 8.583 2.991 724 84 0.250 0.650 0.465 
1994 0.464 0.526 0.380 0.374 360 245 8.667 2.918 727 84 0.261 0.638 0.494 
1995 0.485 0.566 0.420 0.406 333 219 9.750 3.000 712 73 0.341 0.558 0.528 
1996 0.488 0.610 0.432 0.413 326 218 9.621 3.097 678 70 0.366 0.533 0.532 
1997 0.484 0.590 0.427 0.403 350 228 10.780 3.234 761 71 0.318 0.582 0.492 
1998 0.505 0.625 0.471 0.445 359 219 11.470 3.267 769 67 0.344 0.556 0.496 
1999 0.496 0.614 0.451 0.425 339 219 11.111 3.333 731 66 0.361 0.539 0.513 
2000 0.507 0.679 0.481 0.444 337 215 12.382 3.575 746 60 0.367 0.533 0.509 
2001 0.532 0.697 0.541 0.493 312 186 14.583 3.889 698 48 0.432 0.468 0.507 
2002 0.540 0.665 0.549 0.512 213 127 15.333 4.195 464 30 0.639 0.260 0.557 
2003 0.551 0.681 0.571 0.570 295 166 12.740 3.619 583 46 0.487 0.413 0.544 
2004 0.504 0.625 0.472 0.446 280 180 11.845 3.544 600 51 0.441 0.459 0.553 
2005 0.500 0.606 0.459 0.442 319 206 10.915 3.394 662 61 0.372 0.527 0.531 
2006 0.484 0.617 0.437 0.405 360 242 10.327 3.309 756 73 0.320 0.580 0.465 
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